We model the existence of an equilibrium in which analysts adopt a threshold reporting strategy to convey their forecasting ability. Under this strategy, an analyst issues a forecast only if the realized value of her private signal exceeds a threshold value. Higher-ability analysts choose higher threshold levels than lower-ability analysts, and the market correctly interprets all analysts' forecasts. Our model produces implications for using sample mean squared forecast error to measure analysts' ability, offers alternative explanation for the observed bias in analysts' forecasts, and produces testable predictions concerning analysts' decisions to follow a firm and to issue forecasts for firms they follow. Higher-ability analysts choose higher threshold levels than lower-ability analysts, and the market correctly interprets all analysts' forecasts. Our model produces implications for using sample mean squared forecast error to measure analysts' ability, offers alternative explanation for the observed bias in analysts' forecasts, and produces testable predictions concerning analysts' decisions to follow a firm and to issue forecasts for firms they follow.
Introduction
An important task performed by financial analysts is making forecasts. Investors use these forecasts in their evaluation of investment prospects, attaching greater weights to forecasts perceived as more accurate. Given the preference for accuracy, analysts' employers (e.g., investment banks and brokerage houses) value analysts with high predictive ability. Because such predictive ability differs across analysts and is difficult to observe, 1 analysts are usually rewarded based on market perceptions of their ability. Both anecdotal evidence and academic research suggest that perceived ability plays an important role in deciding analysts' current compensation and future careers (Stickel (1992) ). 2 The questions, then, are via what mechanism analysts credibly convey their ability and whether and how investors correctly discern such ability; and more importantly, what implications such mechanism has for analysts' behavior.
1 See, for example, Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) , and Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) . 2 In this paper, an analyst's perceived ability is defined as investors' expectation of her true ability, with the expectation based on certain observed characteristics of the analyst. In a stationary equilibrium, perceived ability equals true ability.
This paper models how incentives to generate market impact and to acquire a reputation for accuracy affect analysts' forecasting behavior. In our model, analysts are endowed with different predictive ability (precision) and cannot communicate their ability directly to investors. We show that an equilibrium exists in which analysts convey their ability by adopting a threshold forecasting strategy. Under this strategy, analysts issue forecasts only when the realized values of their private signals exceed a threshold level -that is, when their private information reveals that the underlying variable (such as earnings) will be unusually favorable or unfavorable. In equilibrium, higher-ability analysts adopt higher thresholds than their lower-ability peers, and investors correctly interpret all analysts' forecasts.
The intuition for the analyst behavior predicted by our model is the following: when analysts are rewarded based on perceived ability, they will seek to impress the market by being both unconventional (in the sense that their forecasts appear aggressive and bold) and wise (in the sense that their forecasts are accurate ex post). Such behavior does not go unnoticed. For example, the stock market pays close attention to remarks by Abby Joseph Cohen, who is perceived to possess extraordinary forecasting ability, and who gained her fame from her strong buy recommendation on AOL when the stock was little known by the market. Ravi Suria rose quickly to stellar fame for his timely bomb on the Internet world, and Amazon.com in particular. In short, analysts are not rewarded for being accurate in forecasting normal or regular events; what adds to an analyst's reputation is her ability and willingness to say something discordant and be proven correct.
Among the theoretical analyses devoted specifically to analyst behavior, our paper is most closely related to Trueman (1994) . 3 Trueman (1994) shows that analysts' concern for perceived ability could lead to a herding equilibrium in which low-ability analysts hide their type by disregarding their own information and imitating prior forecasts by other analysts. Our paper differs from Trueman (1994) in the following ways. First, in addition to caring about ex post measured accuracy, analysts in our model care about the concurrent market impact their forecasts generate.
That is, we model analysts' strategic behavior to convey their true ability and to influence their 3 Other theoretical analyses on analysts' behaviors include Hayes (1998) and Morgan and Stocken (2000) . Hayes (1998) studies analysts' decision to collect information, as opposed to decision to disseminate information (i.e., forecasting decisions). Morgan and Stocken (2000) link the optimistic bias in analysts' forecasts to analysts' private information about their objective functions. However, their model assumes that investors know analysts' ability and therefore does not address how analysts establish the reputation of their predictive ability.
perceived ability. Second, while the decision of whether to issue a forecast is assumed in Trueman (1994) , it is endogenous in our model. 4 Lastly, Trueman's herding equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium; whereas we establish a separating equilibrium in which analysts balance perceived accuracy and true accuracy such that high-ability analysts separate themselves from low-ability ones by choosing different strategies about whether to forecast. In addition to accommodate empirical facts that are usually explained by herding models similar to Trueman (1994) , 5 the results from our model produce testable predictions that are not generated by the herding models. Briefly, our model provides at least four empirical implications. First, we demonstrate that the sample mean squared error of forecasts, a commonly used measure of forecast accuracy and a proxy for analysts' forecasting ability, underestimates both analysts' true ability and the dispersion of ability across analysts. This bias suggests that studies of determinants of analysts' forecast accuracy are subject to systematic measurement error. It also implies that when identifying analysts of high forecasting ability, researchers should look at both the measured forecast accuracy and the market impact of the forecasts (e.g., the magnitude of stock price movement and trading volume on the forecast release date). Second, our paper provides an alternative explanation to strategic incentives for the welldocumented optimism in analysts' forecasts. 6 Our model shows how analysts' dual goals (market impact and measured accuracy) may lead to the appearance of biased forecast even though analysts always truthfully disclose their private signals (which are unbiased estimates of the true earnings) if and when they issue reports. 7 In this regard, our paper identifies a mechanism similar to McNichols and O'Brien (1997) , who argue that analysts choose to follow and issue forecasts about firms 4 Analysts do not issue forecasts for firms they follow in every period. An examination of analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts as reported in Zacks from year 1995 to 1999 reveals that, out of the 20 possible quarterly earnings forecasts, the mean (median) analyst issued only 9 (8) forecasts, and only 1% of the analysts issued forecasts for all 20 quarters.
5 See, for example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) , Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) , Lamont (2001), and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) . For a summary of herding models, see Devenow and Welch (1996) and Graham (1999) . 6 For example, the incentives to curry managements' favor to gain access to future managerial information (Francis and Philbrick (1993) , Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Lim (2001) ), or to obtain business opportunities such as brokerage and/or investment banking relations (Dugar and Nathan (1995) , Lin and McNichols (1998) , and Michaely and Womack (1999) for which they hold favorable views. Our paper differs from theirs in providing a formal theory to explain how such forecasting behavior arises as analysts' optimal choice.
Third, our paper establishes relations between characteristics of firms' underlying information environment and analysts' forecasting behavior, both in terms of the decision to initiate coverage of a stock and the decision to issue a forecast conditional on following a stock. In particular, we
show that an analyst is more likely to follow a stock if investors' prior information about the firm is relatively inaccurate, if the firm's earnings are relatively unpredictable, or if following the firm can generate large trading commissions. We also show that conditional on an analyst's decision to follow a stock, she is more likely to issue forecasts when the information about the firm is more accurate, when the predictability of the underlying earnings is relatively high, and when she is held more responsible for her ex post measured forecast accuracy.
Finally, our model identifies a positive relation between the amount of information available about a firm and the amount of information provided by analysts. To the extent that analyst supplied information reduces information asymmetry between firms and investors, this positive relation implies that more disclosure by firms induces more information release by analysts. Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2001) provide empirical evidence consistent with a complementary relation between analyst reports and firm supplied information revealed in earnings announcements.
Although the threshold reporting strategy generates many empirical predictions that are consistent with existing evidence, we do not claim that it is the only mechanism for analysts to convey their forecasting ability, nor do we claim that it explains all aspects of analyst behaviors. Under specific assumptions about analysts' work environments and reward structures, other behaviors may emerge as analysts' optimal choice, such as the herding behavior identified in Trueman (1994), or the tendency to issue optimistic stock recommendations as studied in Morgan and Stocken (2000) . To the extent that the mechanism identified in the paper produces empirically consistent predictions, our model provides an alternative theory to understand analysts behavior. As Welch (2000) recognizes: "...if there was a theory of the decision processes under the null hypothesis of 'no herding,' it would be much easier to detect the alternative." As we show in detail in section 4, our model can help reconcile seemingly conflicting results and help design more powerful empirical tests.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set up the basic model in section 2 and solve for the equilibrium in section 3. Section 4 discusses comparative statics and explores their empirical implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model setup
Timing of the events
Let z denote a firm's earnings that an analyst is forecasting. 8 z is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ 2 z ≡ 1 pz . Prior to t = 1, investors receive a private signal x about z, with
where ε x ∼ N (0, 1 px ) and is independent of z (i.e., ρ z,εx = 0). 9 After observing x, investors update their beliefs about z using Bayes' rule. The posterior distribution of z is normal with mean z 1 and variance var(z|x) (see, e.g., Casella and Berger (1990) ), where
That is, z 1 is investors' consensus expectation of z conditional on their own information. We assume that analysts do not observe the actual realization of x, which implies that analysts do not know the market's true expectation of z at time t = 1. This assumption excludes situations in which analysts' forecasting strategy depends on the actual x. 10 As we show in subsequent 8 Throughout the paper, we often refer to z as earnings. However, z can span a range of constructs, from macroeconomic indicators (e.g., interest rate to be announced by the Fed) to industry or firm-specific information (e.g., stock recommendation). The key features that we require of z are that it affects the return on investors' investment and that its true value will be revealed at some known time in the future. 9 Throughout the paper, p stands for the precision level (the inverse of variance) of a random variable. ρ i,j denotes the coefficient of correlation between random variables i and j. 10 This assumption implies that an analyst cannot accurately infer the level of x given her own information and the current stock price. The assumption is not as restrictive as it appears. First, in reality analysts may observe information available to investors, but they do not know which information the marginal investor has access to and/or how individual investors' expectations are aggregated into the market's expectation. Second, stock price reflects investors' expectations about many factors other than z (e.g., risk factor). Analysts may not know exactly which movement in the stock price is due to the revised expectation about z. Finally, the analyst's signal is still comparative statics results, this assumption helps establish a link between analysts' forecasting behavior and the quality of investors' prior information. 11 Analysts do know that x is generated according to (1) and that investors update their expectation about z according to (2) and (3).
At time t = 1, an analyst receives a private signal y about z with
where ε y ∼ N (0, 1 py ) and ρ z,εy = ρ εx,εy = 0. 12 Analysts differ in their predictive ability, indexed by the precision level of their private signal (p y ) with higher p y denoting higher predictive ability. Each analyst's ability is private information and cannot be directly observed by or communicated to investors. For notational ease, we define the relative precision of an analyst's signal as
Investors have a prior assessment that p is distributed F with density f and support
If investors can observe both p and y, they will, upon observing y, update their belief about z using Bayes' rule. Because all signals follow normal distributions, investors' updated assessment of z after observing y is distributed normally with mean
and variance
When investors do not directly observe the true p, they use their perception about an analyst's ability to make the assessment. Let p ≡ py px+pz+ py be investors' perception of an analyst's ability. Then
correlated with investors' signal through their common component z.
11
As opposed to the level of investors' prior expectation, as is typically studied in the literature (e.g., Hayes (1998) ). 12 εx and εy are assumed to be independent for simplicity. The market and analysts' private signals (x and y)
are still correlated via their common association with z. Main results hold as long as εx and εy are not perfectly correlated (if they are, there would be no demand for analysts' information).
Note that p is the weight investors place on the analyst's signal y. The higher their perception of the analyst's ability is, the greater weight investors place on her forecasts, and therefore the more influential the analyst's forecasts are.
Finally, z is realized and made known to the public at time t = 2. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of the events.
Common prior about z.
Investors receive x; investors update beliefs about z.
Analyst receives y; analyst forecasts; investors update beliefs about z again.
True z is revealed. We assume that analysts' objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the measured accuracy and the market impact of their forecasts, two factors that affect analysts' current market value and future career. We assume this objective to capture the essence of how analysts are evaluated and rewarded. Both empirical and anecdotal evidence show that analysts care about their forecast accuracy. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) We measure an analyst's accuracy by the mean squared errors (M SE) of her forecasts, i.e.,
which is a commonly used measure for analysts' precision in the literature (see, e.g., studies cited in Clement (1999) ).
To capture analysts' incentives to generate market impact and/or trading commissions, we use a reduced form representation of trading commissions from Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) and Hayes (1998) , and measure the expected market impact (EM I) by the mean squared revisions of investors' expectations about z upon the analyst's forecast, i.e.,
where z 1 and z 2 are investors' best estimates of z before and after receiving an analyst's forecast, as defined in (2) and (7). Since z is a determinant of the stock price, changes in investors' expectation about z cause changes in the stock price, and bigger revision of z leads to price change of greater magnitude. The general intuition behind interpreting (9) as proportional to trading commissions is that the larger the revisions in their expectations about z, the more trading investors need to do to rebalance their portfolios to optimal allocations. Substituting (7) into (9), we have
Thus, the potential trading commissions an analyst can generate for a given forecast is increasing in p, the analyst's perceived precision level. More generally, (9) shows that the intensity with which the market responds to the analyst's forecasts is increasing in p. Therefore, the analyst cares about the market impact as expressed in (9) because a big impact demonstrates that she is perceived to have high predictive ability and that her forecasts are taken seriously by investors.
Such perceived ability is valuable to the analyst's current and/or potential employers (and hence to the analyst) because as far as employers are concerned, it does not matter what the analyst's true ability is conditional on her perceived ability. All that matters is that investors think the analyst is good and therefore, will likely bring their businesses to the analyst's employer.
Given how investors form perception p (·) about analysts' precision, an analyst chooses a forecasting strategy to maximize her objective function
where λ ∈ R + represents the penalty assessed on the analyst's forecasting errors relative to the benefit accrued to the analyst for market impact. In general, without additional assumptions (such as those specific to the set of strategies available to analysts and/or related to investors' belief system), it is difficult to characterize the equilibrium solutions. For this reason, we focus on a class of equilibria in which analysts signal their true ability by adopting a threshold reporting strategy of the following form: an analyst issues a forecast y if and only if |y| ≥ b where b ∈ [0, ∞). 14 Investors, on observing b, form their belief about p using Bayes' rule, i.e.,
where P(b) is the set of analysts that optimally choose b.
The focus on threshold reporting strategy requires two assumptions. First, when analysts choose to issue forecasts, they always truthfully disclose their private signals. That is, though not required to reveal their private signals y, analysts cannot willfully misrepresent them due to regulatory requirements, for example, anti-fraud laws in general or the "Chinese walls" for financial institutions specifically. 15 This assumption is motivated by our focus on how analysts can convey their ability by choosing strategies about whether, not what, to forecast. It also excludes the possibility that analysts condition their forecasts on other analysts' forecasts (e.g., the herding and anti-herding behavior). The policy implications from the two types of strategies are quite different. As we demonstrate, the results from our model can accommodate empirical facts that are usually explained by models in which analysts strategically misrepresent their private information. Therefore, to the extent that our model (based on truthful reporting) generates predictions consistent with existing empirical facts, proposed policies to monitor analysts' tendency for misrepresenting their information in earnings forecasts are perhaps unnecessary. 16
14 If the common prior about z is θ = 0, the threshold can be expressed as |y − θ| ≥ b. The lower bound for b is zero is by construction.
15 Hayes (1998) makes the same assumption about analysts' forecasts. Fishman and Hagerty (1989) (10) The focus of our model is to understand the impact of analysts' concerns for perceived ability and their incentives for establishing a reputation for true ability on their behavior. The model setup and assumptions are made to sharpen the key intuition of our model that with repeated forecasts, the pattern of forecasts reveals information about analysts' ability before outcomes are realized, and consequently, high-ability analysts have incentives to adopt a forecasting pattern that is difficult for low-ability analysts to mimic. We identify the threshold reporting strategy as one such pattern that leads to a separating equilibrium, and we show that it generates interesting implications supported by empirical evidence. We do not claim, however, that the threshold reporting strategy is the only mechanism for analysts to convey their forecasting ability. Other behaviors may emerge regulatory code governing the role of analysts, in an attempt to convince the US Congress to give self-regulation a chance to succeed before proposing legislation. 17 For example, investors can form a maximum likelihood estimation of an analyst's b based on her past forecasts.
If the common prior is normalized to zero, b can be no higher than the minimum of all forecasts that the analyst has made so far.
as optimal given specific assumptions about analysts' work environments and reward structures. 18
Furthermore, to the extent that analysts face other incentives not incorporated in their concerns for perceived and true ability, our model does not address the possibility that analysts may strategically misrepresent their information in order to cater for the investment banking businesses of their employers (Morgan and Stocken (2000) ).
3 Threshold reporting strategy and separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Intuition and basic results
We first establish some basic results to illustrate the intuition, and then provide a formal proof.
Because all variables (x, y and z) follow normal distributions, we focus on the case where analysts report whenever y ≥ b; symmetry implies that all arguments apply to the opposite case y ≤ −b.
The analyst's objective function becomes
where the first term is the mean squared error and the second term is the expected market impact.
The market impact term is adjusted by a probability measure Pr(y ≥ b) because analysts cannot influence the market unless they release a forecast. Furthermore, given (4), the mean squared error term can be simplified as
where
, and
is the hazard function of the standard normal distribution. 19 One of the main intuitions for the threshold reporting strategy is immediate from the following lemma. (All proofs are in the appendix.)
Lemma 1 For all parameter values, the following relations hold:
and
18 For example, the herding behavior identified in Trueman (1994) and Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) may be optimal when analysts are rewarded based on their forecast accuracy relative to their peers only. 19 (14) follows from the standard result that for any two random variables x and y that follow a binomial normal
Lemma 1 states that an increase in b implies that issued forecasts will be less accurate for all analysts, but less so for high-precision analysts. The intuition follows from the varying information content of extreme private signals for analysts at different levels of precision. When a realized signal deviates significantly from the common prior, it is more likely to contain some valuable conditional information if the distribution that generates the signal has a high precision level; and it is more likely to contain noise if the precision is low. If low-precision analysts maintain a high reporting threshold, they constrain themselves to reporting only signals of very extreme values and will likely embarrass themselves by exposing to the market the noise component of their private information.
On the other hand, high-precision analysts can maintain a high threshold to show the market their unconventional wisdom.
High-precision analysts also enjoy a relative advantage in market influence. To see this, notice that (7) implies z 2 − z 1 = p(y − z 1 ) under truthful reporting. Straight-forward algebra shows that y − z 1 follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1 p(px+pz) . Factoring the p term out of the expectation sign and using the standard results for jointly normal variables, we can express the market impact term as
and ρ 2 y− z 1 ,y = 1 p (1 − ρ 2 x,z )ρ 2 y,z . Therefore the market impact is proportional to the M I(p, b) term and is strictly increasing in the analyst's perceived precision p. What is more interesting is the implication from the following lemma. < 0 implies that for a given p, analysts' expected market impact is handicapped by a high threshold b. This result occurs because analysts forego some opportunities to influence the market when they choose not to issue forecasts. However, for the same threshold b, the marginal cost of not issuing forecasts is smaller for high-precision analysts, as the positive cross-partial sign in Lemma 2 implies. 20 The intuition behind the positive cross-partial sign is as follows: for any given forecast y, lower-precision analysts, with a lower perceived ability in equilibrium, have smaller market impact. Therefore, they have to make more forecasts to accumulate market impact. Highprecision analysts, on the other hand, may forego some opportunities to issue forecasts when their signals reveal little importance of their private information (i.e., when |y| ≤ b); it is this extra capacity that distinguishes high-precision analysts from their less able peers.
Together, lemmas 1 and 2 imply that a high-ability analyst can signal her ability by maintaining a higher threshold b and yet achieve the same market impact as, and without appearing less accurate than, a lower-ability analyst who maintains a lower b. In equilibrium, the market realizes that high-precision analysts can afford higher thresholds, and a separating equilibrium is reached where sorting of reporting thresholds parallels that of analysts' precision levels. This intuition is formally proved in the next section.
A separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium
In this section we search for a pure-strategy threshold reporting equilibrium that can be represented 
where M SE and M I are defined in equations (14) and (16), respectively. Accordingly, the market's expectation of p is given by Bayes' rule, as specified in (12). When b(p) is strictly monotonic in p, the expectation will be the inverse of b(p). Below we give a definition of a separating Bayesian
Nash equilibrium for our model and then state the main result in Proposition 1.
Definition In the forecasting game described above, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists if (1) there equilibrium is fully separating if (i) the function b (p) is strictly monotonic in p given p, and
(ii) the market forms a correct inference based on b, that is, p(b) = p.
Proposition 1 In the forecasting game described above, if all analysts have precision levels above a lower bound p > p 0 , there exists a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where an analyst releases her private signal if and only if the signal is greater than some threshold b. Further, analysts of higher precision levels maintain higher reporting thresholds than analysts of lower precision levels.
Proposition 1 establishes that analysts sort themselves on the reporting threshold which in equilibrium reveals their type before the realization of the actual earnings z. The optimal threshold b * is determined by making the incentive compatible constraint bind on the margin. Consider the simple example where there are only two precision levels: p and p with p < p. Because maintaining a non-zero threshold reduces both the market impact and the measured accuracy, the p-type, if unable to mimic the p-type in equilibrium, will choose b = 0. The p-type, however, needs to maintain b high enough so that the p-type is just indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking.
Accordingly, b is the solution to the following equation:
Equation (18) 
Taking the derivative with respect to b and rearranging terms, we have
∂b . Standard screening theory shows that if the single crossing property is satisfied (as ensured by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2), then the downward imitation constraint is slack and local separation is necessary and sufficient for global incentive compatibility (Hart (1983) ; Mailath (1987) ). Therefore, we have the following corollary characterizing the equilibrium solution:
Corollary 1 If the analyst's precision p follows a continuous distribution over the support of [p, p] where p > p 0 , then the analyst's threshold strategy b as a function of p is the solution to the first-order differential equation db dp
with the initial condition b(p) = 0, where M I and M SE are as defined in (14) and (16). Further, db dp > 0, b > 0 with probability one, and such an equilibrium is unique.
It is worth noting that the nature of the equilibrium established above differs from the herding equilibrium in Trueman (1994) , which is essentially a pooling equilibrium. In Trueman (1994) , investors use the ex post accuracy measure to update their perception about an analyst's ability and the analyst chooses what to forecast to maximize the expected perceived expectation. Because their own signals are not as informative as those of high-precision analysts, low-precision analysts would imitate previous forecasts when they obtain an extreme signal, as doing so reduces their expected ex post forecast errors. Two conditions are needed for this herding equilibrium: the knowledge of forecasts by other analysts and the absence of costs from discarding one's own information. In terms of the first condition, analysts in our model make their optimal decision without knowing the market's consensus beyond what is embedded in the common prior. In terms of the second condition, our model imposes a cost for an analyst to imitate/reiterate previous forecasts, as doing so generates little business (i.e., market impact). Empirically, our model generates two predictions not implied by herding models. First, our model suggests that investors respond differently to forecasts issued by analysts of different perceived abilities, a prediction supported by evidence in Stickel (1992) and Chen, Francis, and Jiang (2002) . Second, our model predicts that high-ability analysts are more likely to deviate from consensus and make bold forecasts. 21 Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) find that stock prices respond more strongly to lead analysts' forecast revisions than to followers' revisions, but the difference is 21 In Trueman (1994), low-ability analysts are more likely to "shave" their forecasts if their signals are extreme, making it appear that high-ability analysts make bold forecasts. However, this result is driven by the assumption that the market prior is weighted favorably towards less extreme observations. statistically significant only for those revisions that deviate significantly from the consensus, which is consistent with our prediction. If more experienced/older analysts possess higher ability, 22 Lamont (2001) and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000)'s findings are also consistent with our model that experienced/older analysts are more likely to issue forecasts that deviate from consensus.
Comparative statics and empirical implications
In this section, we relate our model to empirical findings about analyst forecasts. We first discuss the implications for interpreting some existing empirical facts about analyst behavior, including measures used to identify analyst ability and forecast bias. We then use the comparative static results to gain additional insights into the determinants of analysts' forecasting behavior in general.
Implications for measuring analysts' ability
An immediate implication from the threshold reporting equilibrium is that the sample mean squared error of an analyst's forecasts, a commonly used measure for accuracy, is not an unbiased estimator of the analyst's true forecasting precision. 23 Without adjusting for the analyst's optimal threshold choice, the sample mean squared error measures a conditional mean squared error of the following form:
. Because the second term in (22) is always positive whenever b > 0, the sample mean squared error underestimates analysts' true forecasting ability (p y ). A less immediate, but more important, implication is that the dispersion of analysts' ability levels is also underestimated.
This result occurs because measured forecast errors are increasing in the reporting threshold, at the same time that higher-ability analysts employ higher thresholds (i.e.,
∂M SE ∂b
> 0 and db * dp > 0). The two opposing forces make it difficult to detect significant differences in analysts' forecasting ability.
The result is represented graphically in Figure 2 . We use the following parameterization: p z = 1, p x = 2, and λ = 1. The 45-degree line represents the true precision levels and the dotted 22 Either because they learn from experience or because they survive in the profession. 23 The discussion in this subsection also applies to the case in which forecast accuracy is measured by the sample average of the absolute value of forecast errors.
line shows the measured precision levels (the inverse of M SE) that result from analysts' optimal threshold reporting strategy. The measured precision line, with its slope everywhere less than one, lies consistently below the true precision line. This result has implications for studies which seek to identify high-ability analysts and which examine the effect of experience on analysts' forecasting accuracy. Although investors seem to believe that certain analysts (e.g., Institutional Investor All-American analysts) possess superior forecasting ability, academic research provides mixed results about whether significant differences exist in financial analysts' forecasting ability. 24 Our model suggests that testing analysts' ability using mean squared error alone, as is done in most studies examining ability, has low power and may fail to detect differences when they exist. Our model implies that market impact measures can increase the power of such tests, consistent with the analyses in Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) to identify lead analysts. Specifically, Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) rank analysts on forecast accuracy, trading volume on the forecast release date and timing of forecast release. They find that lead analysts identified by one of these criteria are also likely to lead in the other two, with 24 See Clement (1999) for a discussion.
forecast accuracy being the least informative of the three criteria. 25
Our model also provides two insights which help to reconcile empirical findings concerning the effect of experience on forecasting ability. The first point concerns Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) and Clement (1999) 's findings that analysts' forecast accuracy (as measured by the inverse of the sample mean squared errors of their forecasts) improves as they make more forecasts, consistent with learning-by-doing. Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) find that the learning-by-doing effect disappears when one controls for analysts' aptitude and brokerage characteristics. Because it is costly to use a threshold strategy to signal ability, high-ability analysts may stop using the threshold reporting strategy after having built their reputation (from making successful bold forecasts early in their career). Discarding the threshold strategy implies that the ex post measured forecast accuracy would increase later in an analyst's career, even though the improvement in ability is absent. Without knowing each analyst's threshold, researchers may conclude (erroneously) that analysts improve forecast precision from experience.
The second insight from our model concerning experience is that when there is the learningby-doing effect, the presence of threshold reporting reduces the power of empirical tests based on sample mean squared errors. This is because as an analyst's precision level p y increases with experience, her optimal threshold b * also increases. These two forces work against each other and reduce the slope of improvement in the ex post measured M SE. We have shown in Figure 2 how increasing b * makes measured precision less sensitive to improvement in true precision.
Implication for the optimistic bias in earnings forecasts
The threshold reporting equilibrium provides an alternative explanation for the observed bias in analysts' earnings forecasts, documented by numerous empirical studies (see, e.g., Butler and Lang (1991) ). At least two explanations have been posited and tested in the literature for this bias.
The first suggests that analysts' working environment provides incentives to intentionally add a (positive) bias term to analysts' true assessment of the firm. 26 These studies have been criticized 25 Although our model does not directly speak to the timing of the forecast issuance, the same mechanism can be applied to analysts' timing strategy. Specifically, if all analysts can improve their precision by waiting, high-ability analysts have stronger incentives to forecast earlier because improved precision over time helps them less than it does lower-ability analysts.
26 See footnote 6 for a brief summary, or McNichols and O'Brien (1997) for a more detailed discussion.
on the grounds that such behavior seems unlikely to survive in equilibrium, and are more likely to be an artifact of potential measurement mis-specifications (e.g., cross-sectionally correlated errors (Keane and Runkle (1998) ), sample selection bias (McNichols and O'Brien (1997) ), and benchmark selection mis-specification (Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000))).
Our model suggests that the truth is probably somewhere in between. Because of the symmetric nature of the normal distribution, the bias in analysts' forecasts in our model has a population mean of zero under the threshold reporting equilibrium. However, other (unmodeled) strategic incentives may lead analysts to issue forecasts only when y ≥ b but not always when y ≤ −b. This may be the case either due to the incentives to curry management favor and/or to obtain revenue generating opportunities, or due to investors' short-selling constraint so that bad news does not generate as much in trading commissions as good news (Hayes (1998) ). If so, analysts' ex post measured bias would be
which is positive and is strictly increasing in b. Furthermore, Corollary 1 says that all analysts (except those with the lowest ability) adopt a positive threshold, which implies that observationally most analysts would appear to be biased. Consequently, using the consensus forecast to measure the bias tendency of analysts as a group would itself be biased. 27
The empirically documented bias in analysts' earnings forecasts, together with analysts' general reluctance to downgrade stocks, has prompted the U.S. Congress to threaten potential legislation to fortify the "Chinese walls" that are supposed to curb the influence of investment banking relations on analyst behavior. 28 While we are not claiming the complete lack of incentives for analysts to intentionally misrepresent their information, we do offer a reason for carefully interpreting the ex post measured bias in their earnings forecasts.
27 McNichols and O'Brien (1997) suggest that incentives to curry for management favor could result in analysts' following (dropping) firms they feel optimistic (pessimistic) about and/or issuing only good news. Our model identifies another mechanism that exacerbates the measured bias due to analysts' signalling incentive, conditional on their decision to follow the firm. To see the difference, analysts in McNichols and O'Brien (1997) would issue forecasts whenever they obtain new signals after they initiate coverage of a firm. In our model, after initiating the coverage, the threshold for actually issuing a forecast is higher for high-ability analysts. 28 See, for example, "Lawmakers probe 'bias' in analysts," Edward Luce, Financial Times, June 15, 2001, p. 5.
Determinants of analysts' forecasting behavior
Our model also sheds light on two other aspects of analysts' forecasting decisions. First, for what types of firms are analysts more likely to initiate coverage? Second, conditional on the coverage decision, what is the frequency and nature of analysts' forecasts? To answer the first question, we assume there is a fixed cost of initiating coverage for a firm and this cost is the same across analysts and firms. 29 Analysts will follow a firm if the expected payoff from following the firm is greater than the start-up cost. The expected payoff is calculated with the understanding that once an analyst starts to follow a firm, she needs to adopt a threshold reporting strategy in order to convey her ability to investors. Let U * (p, b * (p)) be the payoff to an analyst of precision level p whose optimal threshold choice is b * (p). Then the analyst's decision to follow a firm can be analyzed by checking the comparative statics of U * with respect to the underlying parameters.
Corollary 2 Under the threshold reporting strategy, the following comparative statics are true:
Corollary 2 implies that analysts are less likely to initiate coverage if investors are relatively well informed about the firm (p x is relatively high). This prediction is consistent with O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) 's result that the number of new analysts initiating coverage for a firm is negatively associated with the number of analysts currently following the firm. Corollary 2 also predicts that analysts are more likely to initiate coverage for firms whose earnings are relatively more unpredictable (p z is low), consistent with findings in Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) that analysts are more likely to follow firms with large intangible assets. In addition, λ (the inverse of the relative weight on the market impact) is relatively small when the potential trading commissions from following the firm are relatively high. Corollary 2 thus also predicts that analysts are more likely to follow large firms and firms with large institutional holdings, 30 a prediction supported by 29 In addition to the material costs involved with keeping records for a new company, other start-up cost include
initial research to understand and analyze the firm's general operating environment and specific managerial characteristics. Bhushan (1989) and Hayes (1998) make the same assumption. 30 The underlying assumption is that large firms whose stocks are relatively liquid and/or firms with large institutional investors are likely to have small λ. Intuitively, more trading is generated for a given piece of new information when the trading costs are low, and trading costs are more likely to be low for liquid stocks and/or for institutional investors.
evidence in Bhushan (1989) and O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) . 31 Other things constant, a higher threshold leads to more aggressive, but less accurate, forecasts on average. In addition, holding constant the number of signals each analyst obtains in a given time period, a higher threshold choice also implies a lower frequency of analyst forecasts. Therefore, the comparative statics of the optimal threshold b * with respect to the underlying parameters can be used to answer the second question: conditional on the fact that an analyst covers a firm, what is the frequency and nature of her forecasts?
Corollary 3 Under the threshold reporting strategy, the following comparative statics are true:
∂b * ∂px < 0, and
Figures 3, 4, and 5 provide a graphical representation of Corollary 3. As in Figure 2 , we use the following set of values as the standard parameterization: p z = 1, p x = 2, and λ = 1. In each graph, we vary one of the parameters and show how the threshold choice b varies with analysts' precision p y . Other things constant, the graphs show that all analysts choose lower thresholds when firms' earnings are relatively easy to predict (i.e., p z is high), when investors' information about the firm is more precise (i.e., p x is high), and when analysts are evaluated more on forecast accuracy (i.e., λ is high). The intuition behind these comparative results can be summarized as follows: (i) The optimal threshold is decreasing in p z for all analysts ( ∂b * ∂pz < 0) because a high p z makes each analyst's own signal appear relatively uninformative. Therefore, an increase in p z has the same effect as a decrease in p y for all analysts. (ii) The optimal threshold is decreasing in p x ( ∂b * ∂px < 0) because the more accurate are investors' signals, the less weight investors place on the analyst's forecast. Therefore, maintaining a high threshold doesn't help analysts in getting more market impact, but hurts their ex post accuracy. (iii) b * is decreasing in λ because high thresholds hurt ex post measured accuracy and are more costly when λ is high.
Because b * is decreasing in p x and p z , Corollary 3 implies that analysts are more likely to issue "cautious" forecasts for firms about which investors have a fairly accurate assessment without the analysts' information, or for firms whose earnings are more predictable. Cross-sectionally, if firm size is a good proxy for the amount of firm-specific information available to investors, our model predicts that, on average, analysts issue more forecasts, and more accurate forecasts, for large firms than is justified by the superior information environments of these firms. In addition, if startup firms, high-tech firms, or firms operating in highly risky environments are more likely to have unpredictable earnings, our model predicts that analysts are more likely to issue more aggressive forecasts about these firms.
Corollary 3 also shows that analysts' forecasting behavior can depend on the time an forecast is issued and on the underlying construct that is being forecasted. In particular, our model predicts that if investors place higher penalty on analysts' errors from recent forecasts than from forecasts made a long time ago, 32 analysts are more likely to issue more forecasts, and more accurate forecasts, the closer the forecast release dates are to the actual earnings release dates. This improvement in accuracy goes beyond the fact that information about a firm generally becomes more accurate as it gets closer to the actual earnings release date (i.e., p x increases as it gets closer to earnings release date). Both predictions are consistent with empirical evidence (see, e.g., Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000)). If we interpret λ as the degree of difficulty to measure analysts' forecast errors, Corollary 3 implies that analysts' behavior with respect to forecasting earnings differs from their behavior with respect to making long-term growth forecasts or stock recommendations. Because it is relatively difficult to measure the performance of analysts in making long-term growth forecasts or stock recommendations, Corollary 3 implies that analysts' long-term growth forecasts or stock recommendations tend to be bolder and less accurate than their earnings forecasts; and this decrease in accuracy goes beyond the fact that long-term forecasts or stock returns are in general more difficult to predict than earnings.
The relation between the market's prior assessment and analysts' forecasting behavior established in Corollary 3 has an interesting implication for firms' disclosure policy. If more informative disclosure by firms increases the precision levels of the investors' private signals (p x ) relative to that of the analysts' (p y ), then ∂b * ∂px < 0 implies that firms can induce more information releases from analysts by increasing the informativeness of their mandatory and/or voluntary disclosures. In this sense, our model establishes a complementary relation between the quality of a firm's disclosure and the amount of information provided by analysts. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with 
Conclusion
In this paper, we establish a mechanism for analysts to convey their ability, given their incentives to generate market impact and to establish a reputation for accuracy. Our model captures the intuition that because a pattern of forecasts reveals information about analysts' ability before outcomes are realized, high-ability analysts have incentives to maintain a forecasting pattern that is difficult for low-ability analysts to mimic. We show that analysts can signal their ability by adopting a threshold reporting strategy where they issue forecasts only when their private signals exceed a threshold level, with higher-ability analysts adopting higher thresholds. The model offers alternative interpretations for existing empirical findings (including the observed bias in analysts' forecasts), produces testable empirical predictions concerning the frequency and nature of analysts' forecasts, and establishes a complementary relation between the informativeness of firms' disclosures and the likelihood of analysts' issuing forecasts.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The following results are useful throughout the proof. 
Rewrite equation (14) as
Using the fact
we have
Further, aH (α) is an increasing and convex function of α, a fact we will use later.
Next we prove that ∂M SE ∂py < 0 and
Without loss of generality, we normalize var(z) = 1. We can fix b and let α vary one-to-one with var(ε y ) or p y , i.e.,
and we have
To show that ∂M SE ∂py < 0, we need to show that ∂M SE ∂x > 0.
The last step follows from H = H(H − α). Gordon (1941) shows that
For any given b, α is increasing in p y . ∂g ∂α < 0 would imply
b 2 − 1 < 0, it remains to be shown that
for all b and all α ∈ [0, b].
Rewrite ψ as
Note that all terms A, B, C, and D are positive and A > 1 > C. In addition, B and D only involve functions of standard normal distributions and do not concern any parameters. Finally, we verify that B > D for all values of α.
Note that (32) is nothing but a comparison of the average and the marginal slope of the ϕ (α) function. By L'Hopital's rule,
Because ( 
To show ∂M I(p,b) ∂p < 0, we first obtain
The first term is negative because ∂ρ 2 ∂p < 0 as shown below.
Hence
We now derive 
. Then
Further expanding each of the terms in the bracket, we have ∂b∂py ) = −sign(F ), we need to prove that there exists a p 0 such that F < 0 for all p > p 0 and all α ≥ 0. Since F is quadratic in α 2 , a sufficient condition for this to be true is: F | α=0 ≤ 0 and dF dα | α=0 < 0. When α = 0,
Therefore F | α=0 ≤ 0 if and only if the term in the bracket is non-positive. With tedious but straight-forward algebra and the fact that ρ 2 1−ρ 2 (p − ρ 2 y,z ) = 1 − ρ 2 yz , we further simplify this term as below
For notational ease, let x = α 2 − 1. To establish the condition for dF dα | α=0 < 0, we can rewrite R = 1 + ρ 2 x and In equilibrium, the market has the correct inference that p(b ) > p(b). Given the partial derivative results established in Lemmas 1 and 2, when p > p 0 , by revealed preference, we have
We will show that this is a contradiction. Proof of Corollary 1. Equation (21) is obtained by substituting the equilibrium condition p(b) = b in equation (20). M SE (b) > 0 and M I (b) < 0 (as shown in the appendix) imply that db dp > 0, and continuity of analysts' type distribution implies |b| > 0 with probability one. Finally, by Mailath (1987) , the initial condition b(p) = 0 and the single crossing property of the objective function (i.e., We have shown in Proposition 1 that in equilibrium 
